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ABSTRACT 
Since the inception of the construct of transaction governance structure (TGS), transaction cost economics (TCE) has 
become an important anchor for the analysis of a wide range of economic and organizational issues. As theory of TCE 
advances, the perception of TGS has shifted from a polar classification (market/hierarchy) towards a continuum of 
market-hierarchy [17][20]. Despite the development in conceptual framework, empirical work based on the idea of the 
market-hierarchy continuum is scarce. Part of the difficulty is the lack of clear defined and operational dimensions of 
TGS. Although dimensionalization of transaction has received early and explicitly attention, the dimensionalization of 
TGS is relatively limited. This paper is an initial effort in instrument building. In this paper, we will (1) review the 
literature on TGS, (2) survey 40 empirical studies from 1982 to 2002, (3) present dimensions of TGS based on 
Williamson’s work of 1991, (4) run a preliminary test to compare TGSs of brick-and-mortar and click-and-order.  
 




In the recent years, we have observed the broad shifts of 
TGS in the United States such as a large-scale 
integration among banks, security firms, and insurance 
companies [34] and a continuous migration toward 
market TGS in the computer industry in which 
component manufacturers are replacing fully-integrated 
computer manufacturers [23]. This confusing landscape 
of TGS changes raises questions about reasons for the 
TGS shift, the nature of the new TGSs, and the 
influential factors in designing and selecting a TGS. At 
the macro level, the answer to these questions will help 
policy makers in developing economic and 
governmental policies. At the micro level, the answer to 
these questions will help company managers to make 
decisions regarding TGS, such as what to buy, where to 
buy, or how to buy.  
 
The fundamental construct for answering these 
questions is TGS. Since the inception of the construct of 
transaction governance structure (TGS), transaction cost 
economics (TCE) has become an important anchor for 
the analysis of a wide range of economic and 
organizational issues. As theory of TCE advances, the 
perception of TGS has shifted from a polar 
classification (market/hierarchy) towards a continuum 
of market-hierarchy [17][20]. Despite the development 
in conceptual framework, empirical work based on the 
idea of the market-hierarchy continuum is scarce. Part 
of the difficulty is the lack of clear defined and 
operational dimensions of TGS. Although dimensionali-
zation of transaction has received early and explicitly 
attention, the dimensionalization of TGS is relatively 
limited. This paper is an initial effort in instrument 
building. The organization of the paper is as follows. 
Section 1 is an introduction. Section 2 reviews the 
literature on TGS. Section 3 surveys 40 empirical 
studies from 1982 to 2002. Section 4 presents 
dimensions of TGS based on Williamson’s work of 
1991. Section 5 runs a preliminary test to compare 
TGSs of brick-and-mortar and click-and-order. Section 
6 is a conclusion.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Transaction Cost Economics (TCE)  
 
The construct of TGS is defined as the structure that 
mediates exchanges of goods or services between 
technology separable entities—businesses, subdivisions 
of a business, or individual buyers and sellers [46][47]. 
Ring and Van de Ven further defined TGS as “the legal 
forms of governance that apply to different kinds of 
transactions (ranging from markets to hierarchies), and 
the structural and procedural safeguards that parties 
negotiate into a transaction” [38]. Traditional TCE 
perceives TGS from a dichotomous view in which 
market and hierarchy are mutually exclusive [11][47]. 
At one end lie purely market-based TGSs, in which 
price is the invisible hand that mediates supply and 
demand [40]. At the other end, one finds purely 
hierarchical TGS, in which a central authority controls 
and allocates resources [9]. Typically, attempts to 
explain the selection of a TGS for a particular good or 
service have been based on comparisons between 
market and hierarchy transaction costs [11][46][47]. 
Generally speaking, when asset specificity of a 
transaction is low, market TGS is more economical and 
preferable. When asset specificity is high, hierarchy has 
the advantage of lower governance costs. A substantial 
amount of research has produced results consistent with 
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2.2 Network  
 
TEC rests on the premise that market and hierarchy are 
mutually exclusive. Powell [35] does not agree with this 
premise or the concept of a market-hierarchy continuum, 
which is suggested by John and Reve [20]. Powell 
describes the network as the third independent form of 
governance structure. Ouchi [30] claims that price, rule, 
and trust are control mechanisms for markets, 
hierarchies, and networks, respectively. Bradach and 
Eccles [7] argue that three control mechanisms (price, 
authority, and trust) can be combined in a variety of 
ways under each structure, e.g., price and authority 
mechanisms under a market structure or a price and 
authority combination in a hierarchy.  
 
3. REVIEW OF 40 EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
1982-2002 
 
This paper reported 40 empirical studies on TGS from 
1982 to 2002. These studies had examined the construct 
of TGS either as an independent variable or a dependent 
variable. The review of these studies was focused on the 
dimensionalization of TGS and the type of instrument 
developed (see Table 1, available from the author upon 
request).  
 
The majority of studies in 1980’s perceived TGS as 
dichotomous and developed single-dimension and 
single-item scales [1][2][3][4][43][44][27]. These 
dichotomous single-dimension and single-item scales 
used 1 and 0 to record the decisions such as buy or 
make, integrate or not integrate, use internal work force 
or use external agents. Following that, some 
multichotomous scales were developed [5][15][21][22]. 
These multichotomous single-dimension and single-
item scales measured TGSs into discrete categories 
(market, joint venture, partner relationships, hierarchy) 
along the market-hierarchy continuum. In 1990’s, as the 
perception of TGS shifted from a polar classification 
(market/hierarchy) towards a continuum of market-
hierarchy, multi-dimensional and multi-items instru-
ments were developed to incorporate the variety of 
cooperative relationships [8][17][19][20][18][29][32] 
[33]. Table 1 categorized the 40 empirical studies into 
groups according to the types of scale used.  
 
There were two interesting trends among the multi-
dimensional instruments. First, several multi-
dimensional instruments captured the dimensions of 
formalization, centralization, flexibility and control 
[8][19][20]. Such dimensionalization gave a flavor of 
organization theory from Pugh who provided the 
theoretical framework for study organization structure 
[36][37]. According to Pugh and others, “six primary 
dimensions of organization structure were defined: (1) 
specialization, (2) standardization, (3 formalization, (4) 
centralization, (5) configuration, (6) flexibility” [37]. 
 
Secondly, dimensions of information exchange and 
interaction started to appear in middle 80’s [18][29][31] 
[32][33]. This trend was coincided with the time period 
when global competition intensified, firms moved 
towards flatter and more horizontal structures, and 
management emphasized cooperation rather than 
competition among self-managed teams and among 
inter-organization alliances [12]. In the same time period, 
we had seen the new research streams in managing 
dynamic processes [14], social network analysis [35], and 
information processing and conflict management [10][28]. 
 
4. DIMENSIONS OF TGS 
 
4.1 Williamson’s Framework 
 
There was no consistence on the dimensions of TGS 
among the previous studies. Different scholars 
emphasized different dimensions of the construct. In 
defining dimensions of TGS, this study is going to 
follow the dimensionalization framework put forward 
by Williamson [45]. Williamson’s framework was a 
recent contribution to TCE studies, and it incorporated 
dimensions of TGSs arrayed on the entire range of the 
market-hierarchy continuum. Williamson identified the 
key dimensions that differentiate three generic forms of 
TGS (market, hybrid, hierarchy). These dimensions are 
incentive, control mechanisms, adaptabilities, and types 
of contract law. The incentive is the degree of the price 
acting as an incentive to trigger and control actions. 
Administrative controls are the level of control and 
manipulative power gained through monitoring, career 
rewards, and penalties. Adaptation (A) is the ability to 
take the right actions to adapt to the new equilibrium 
whenever there are changes in the demand or in supply. 
Producers and buyers independently and autonomously 
response to the price changes to maximize their profits. 
Adaptation (C) is the ability to coordinate among 
interdependent parties to align with a collective goal. 
According to Williamson [45], firms, hybrid, and 
hierarchy are governed under different laws—classical 
contract law, neoclassical contract law, and forbearance 
respectively. The role of court becomes less important 
from classic to neoclassic to forbearance law. Table 2 
(available from the author upon request) exhibits how 
market, hybrid, hierarchy are different along these 
dimensions.  
 
4.2 Fit the 40 studies into William’s Framework 
 
In Table 3, the existing dimensions from 40 empirical 
studies were assigned into the five dimensions defined 
by Williamson. Although the assignments were 
subjective and crude, this exercise was helpful in 
mapping relationships and identifying the dimension 
that needed further development. As you can see from 
Table 3, the incentive dimension was underdeveloped. 
There was limited number of item designed for 
identifying suppliers’ or buyers’ price sensitivity or 
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readiness of adjusting quantity when price and demand 
fluctuated. 
 
Table 3. Assignment Of The Existing Dimensions 
Into Williamson’s Framework 
Incentive through price 
• Exclusivity [8]  
• Pattern of payoffs [32]  
Administrative control 
• Monitoring [41] 
• Buyer’s control over supplier decision making [17] 
• Centralization [21] 
• Centralization [20] 
• Centralization [19] 
• Control [19] 
• Financial incentives [8] 
• Monitoring of supplier [29] 
• Operating controls [33] 
Adaptation (A) 
• Replaceability of commission income [17] 
• Exit costs [40-A]  
• Exit barriers [8] 
• Restraint in the use of power [18]  
Adaptation (C) 
• Collaboration [40A] 
• Collaborative interaction [40-A] 
• Joint action [17] 
• Interactions [20] 
• Behavioral transparency [32] 
• Frequency of interaction [32] 
• Flexibility [18] 
• Information exchange [18] 
• Shared problem solving [18] 
• Supplier flexibility [29] 
• Supplier assistances [29] 
• Information provided to supplier [29] 
• Exchange information [33] 
• Sharing benefi TGS and burdens [33] 
• Adaptation [31] 
• Types of adjustments [31] 
• Information exchange for long-term planning [31] 
• Information exchange for structural panning [31] 
Contract law  
• Buyer’s and supplier’s commitment to the relationship 
[4A] 
• Formalization [21] 
• Expectations of continuity [17] 
• Formalization [20] 
• Formalization [19] 
• Formality [8] 
• Time horizon [32] 
• Expectation of continuity [29] 
• Contractual focus [33] 
• Relationship focus [33] 







5. A PRELIMINARY TEST 
 
5.1 Instrument development and test 
 
The emergence of e-commerce has provided a variety of 
choices of TGS such as online exchanges, distributor 
consortia, supply chain networks, auction, and mass 
catalog compilers [6]. TEC can help us answer the 
questions of what product is suitable for E-commerce 
(digital or tangible products), where to buy (brick-and-
mortar or click-and-order), or how to buy (auction or 
private network). In this study, we will conduct a 
preliminary test on TGSs of brick-and-mortar and click-
and-order.  
 
A penal of expert has generated 24 items (see Table 4) 
along the five dimensions recommended by Williamson 
[45]. All items were presented with 5-pint Likert scale 
ranging from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”. 
Each item is applied to “online” and “offline” separately 
and respondents checked their level agreement 
accordingly. One dependent variable was coded 0 for 
online and 1 for offline, and five independent variables 
were summated scales of five dimensions. Each 
summated scale equaled to the average of measurements 
of all items of the same dimension. The respondents 
were college students. Out of all respondents, 20% had 
shopped online at least 5 times, 30% had shopped online 
at least 10 times, and 50% has shopped online at least 
20 or more times. The sample of 124 was divided into 
an analysis sample of 102 observations with the 
remaining 22 observations constituting the holdout or 




We performed logistic regression on the data set based 









)|1(   (1) 
Where: 
ax=a1x1+ a2x2+ a3x3 + anx4 + anx5;  
e is the base of natural logarithms;  
y is dependent variable (0, 1);  
x1, x2, x3, x4 , x5 is summated variables representing 
incentive, administrative control, adaptation(A), 
adaptation(C), contract law respectively. 
a1, a2, a3, a4, a5 were obtained from regressing result 
(Table 5, available from the author upon request). Thus 
ax=.187x1+ 2.503x2+ 1.799x3+ .692x4 + 1.349x5 – 
19.297.  
 
Table 4. Items For Comparing TGSs Of Brick-And-
Mortar And Click-And-Order 
Incentive  
• There is a big price discrepancy among the same type of 
products offered by different sellers.  
• I do a lot of price comparison among different sellers 
when I’m shipping. * 
The Fourth International Conference on Electronic Business (ICEB2004) / Beijing 
 
631
Administrative control  
• A seller has influence over a buyer’s decision-making. 
• A buyer has influence over a seller’s decision-making. 
• A seller does not know very much about you as a buyer.*
• You as a buyer do not know very much about a seller. * 
• A seller can monitor your shopping behaviors.  
• A seller can manipulate your shopping behaviors. 
• It is easy for a seller to cheat and misrepresent a 
product.* 
Adaptation (A) 
• A seller adjusts his price and production quantity 
according to demand.* 
• Fluctuation of market demand has little impact on price.  
• There are many suppliers making the same or similar 
products.* 
• The goal of a seller is to maximize his profit regardless of 
loss of gain of any other players.* 
• The goal of a buyer is to minimize his cost regardless of 
loss of gain of any other players.* 
• It is easy to become a seller in terms of initial investment 
and market entry cost.* 
Adaptation (C) 
• Negotiations or discussion between a buyer and a seller is 
required to complete a transaction. 
• Explicit communication is required to coordinate 
activities among sellers and buyers. 
• A seller and a buyer usually settle a problem by 
cooperation and negotiation.  
• I would negotiate and cooperate with a seller.  
Contract law  
• A supplier and a buyer usually go to a court to settle a 
dispute.* 
• A supplier and a buyer usually settle a dispute through 
discussions, meetings, or arbitration.  
• A seller usually has to obey the rules and laws set up by a 
local community.  
* Reserved. 
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow test measured the 
correspondence of the actual and predicted values of the 
dependent variable. A better fit would be indicated by a 
smaller difference in the observed and predicted 
classification or by a non-significant chi-square value. 
Our chi-square value was 10.093, which was is not 
significant because p=0.259. Table 6(available from the 
author upon request) presented the classification result. 
In the analysis sample, 74% percent of cases were 
predicted correctly. In the holdout sample, 63% of cased 




In summary, perception of TGS advanced from 
dichotomous to continuous [17][20], from single 
dimension to multiple dimension [29], from local focus 
of by-or-make decision [43] to global discussion of 
international alliances [21][22]. We also observed the 
influence from other disciplines on TCE, such as 
organization theory [16A] and information theory [13].  
 
 “Big ideas often take a long time to take on definition. 
Thirty-five years passed between Coase’s 1937 article 
and efforts to operationalize transaction costs in the 
early 1970’s (Williamsom, 2000. pp.31)” by [46] and 
another twenty years passed before Williamson 
dimensionalized the construct of TGS [45]. The 
previous theoretical and empirical works have laid a 
solid foundation for us to bring the research forward. 
The future research is to conduct empirical studies to 
verify the construct of TGS, to apply TEC in analyzing 
the whole range of cooperative relationships, to move 
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